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RECENT DECISIONS
Passengers - Transportation Contract
Interference -Strike
This action arose after defendant, The International Association of Ma-
chinists, had commenced a lawful strike against an airline. The plaintiff
had entered into a transportation contract with the airline in the form
of a round-trip ticket from Denver to Hawaii. The strike made it im-
possible for the airline to return the plaintiff to Denver at the time of
his request, so alternate transportation was secured by him at an additional
cost of $52.19. Invoking the theory tortious interference with a contract,
plaintiff brought an action against the union for damages suffered, and
was awarded judgment by the district court after an appeal from the
county court decision. Held, reversed: Third persons, who are damaged
by a lawful strike of employees against their employer who consequently
failed to furnish services, have no right of action against the union calling
or maintaining the strike. The International Association of Machinists v.
William H. Southard, 459 P.2d 570 (Colo. Sup. Ct. 1969).
The plaintiff was a third party to the airline, management-labor contract,
and his contractual rights rested solely with the originally ticketed carrier.
The court, therefore, reasoned that any relief obtained by the plaintiff
would have to be ex delicto.
The court found that the strike was in no way illegal, and that the ac-
tion of the union was in compliance with the applicable provisions of the
Railway Labor Act.' Although the plaintiff argued that he had a right
through his contract to be protected against a strike, the court reasoned
that to give rise to a cause of action for tortious interference with con-
tractual rights there must be a wrongful act or a legal act performed in
an unlawful manner. The court emphasized the fact that the action of
the union was not taken intentionally to prevent the air carrier from
performing its contract with the plaintiff, but merely an exercise of its
absolute right to strike.
In conclusion, the court alluded to the fact that a contra decision could
have certain serious economic, social, and practical effects on unions acting
in a lawful manner. Damages to third persons suffered through a lawful
strike are too far removed from the union action to give rise to a cause of
action.
J.H.L.
'Railway Labor Act §§ 1-10, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151-60 (1964).
CURRENT LEGISLATION AND DECISIONS
Prejudgment Garnishment - Constitutionality -
Bank Accounts
Multiple plaintiffs instituted actions for garnishment, under the Wis-
consin garnishment statute' against several bank accounts of the Mueller
Travel Agency, Inc. The initial garnishment action was commenced by
Larson and Meyer (from whom the Mueller Travel Agency had been pur-
chased by Feterston). The complaint alleged claims of indebtedness arising
out of the agency sales transaction with Feterston. In each of these actions
the Air Traffic Conference of America (ATC)2 as well as Johnson and
Parker (officers and directors of the travel agency) intervened as parties
defendants, claiming that the funds in both garnished accounts were trust
funds, not belonging to the Mueller Agency, and therefore, not subject
to garnishment. The ATC group's claim was based on the trust provision
stipulated in the original agency agreement signed with the Mueller Travel
Agency. Johnson and Parker claimed an interest in the action because of
their personal indemnity liability up to $50,0003 for any defalcations of
the trust by the Mueller Travel Agency, Inc. Simultaneously, in a separate
action the ATC attempted to garnish the funds on deposit in both banks.
Johnson and Parker again intervened as parties defendants and, in addi-
tion, cross-claimed against the Mueller Agency as well as Larson and
Meyer who had been named along with Mueller Agency as parties defendant
by ATC.4 The Wisconsin circuit court ordered that the amounts on de-
posit in the two banks be applied to the entire debt owed Larson and Meyer
with the remainder to be applied pro rata to the airlines. Complaints of
Johnson and Parker were dismissed. Both ATC, and Parker and Johnson,
appealed these respective judgments from the lower court. Held, reversed
and remanded: The Wisconsin garnishment procedure employed in the
instant case amounts to a taking of property without procedural due
process that is required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Larson v. Feter-
ston, 11 Av. Cas. 17,334 (Wisc. S. Ct. 1969).
The instant garnishments were commenced in accordance with Wiscon-
'Wis. Stat. § 267.18(2) (a).
aATC represented several airlines (including Northwestern Airlines, Inc., Eastern Airlines,
Inc., Trans World Airlines, Inc., and North Central Airlines, Inc.). These airlines had transacted
an agency agreement with Muller Agency would sell tickets for the several airlines with the stipu-
lation that "all moneys received, less applicable commissions, shall be the property of the Carrier,
and shall be held in trust by the Agent until satisfactorily accounted for to the Carrier . . ."
a The agency agreement between Mueller, Inc. and ATC required that the agents obtain a fidelity
bond. 'Pursuant to this requirement a bond was procured from the Insurance Company of North
America (ICNA) with the express understanding that ICNA would indemnify the ATC group for
all -defaults of the Mueller Travel -Agency, Inc;,. up to .$50,000, but with the requirement that
Johnson, Parker, and Fetherston agree to: personally indemnify ICNA, should such payment to the
ATC group be required.
. "The concern of ATC, and Johnson and Parker, is perhaps even more understandable in light
-of facts which were discovered by ATC shortly -after the initiation of the action by Larson and
Meyer. It seems that the Mueller Agency at some earlier date had negotiated a loan with a local
bank and had pledged the accounts receivable of its ticket sales as collateral for the loan without
informing the ATC group of the transaction. When the Agency later defaulted on its obligations
under the loan, the bank terminated its relationship with the Agency and offset the outstaniding
loan against the Agency's then-existing deposit balance; the balance at that time being substan-
tially composed of proceeds from the ticket sales. The funds retained by that bank are not the
subject of this action.
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sin garnishment procedure which permits the subject of the garnishment
action to be "frozen" temporarily by the creditor, pending litigation out-
come, without notice to the debtor and without any prior hearing.' How-
ever, the court concluded that the rule expressed by the United States Su-
preme Court in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View5 declared
the Wisconsin "prejudgment" garnishment procedure unconstitutional.!
The rule of Sniadach held that a "prejudgment" garnishment procedure is a
violation of the recognized requisites of procedural due process. In that
case, Mr. Justice Harlan pointed out that:
Due process is afforded only by the kinds of 'notice' and 'hearing' which
are aimed at establishing the validity, of the underlying claim against the
alleged debtor before he can be deprived of his property or its unrestricted
use.
The respondents in the instant case contended that the decision in
Sniadach is limited in applicability to only the particular facts of that
case; i.e., garnishment proceedings against an employee's wages in the
hands of his employer.' Although it was granted that the opinion in
Sniadach makes considerable reference of the unconstitutionality of the
procedure upon the wage earner, the court was not persuaded by this
limited application of Sniadach and held:
We think that no valid distinction can be made between garnishments of
wages and that of other property. Clearly, a due process violation should
not depend upon the type of property being subjected to the procedure."
Therefore, since the court found that the Sniadach decision was applicable
to all garnishment actions regardless of the type of property being sub-
jected to the procedure, the awarded judgments were ordered reversed with
directions to dismiss the garnishment complaints."
R.D.B.
Aircraft Insurance - Owner's Negligence -
Failure To Read Policy
In September 1961, plaintiff purchased an aviation policy from defend-
ant, an agent for Eagle Star Insurance Company (Eagle Star), to insure
5 Wis. Stat. § 267.02 (1) (a) 1.
6395 U.S. 337 (1969).
"It should be noted that the instant garnishments were commenced in accordance with Wiscon-
sin statutory law prior to the Sniadach judgment ruling the statute in issue constitutional. The
court in concluding that the rule of Sniadach was applicable pointed out that the instant case was
before the court on appeal and thus had not been finalized; i.e., a pending action. Therefore,
a question of whether or not a rule of constitutional procedure is to be applied retrospectively
was not at issue in this case. The Sniadach decision reached the stage of finalization while the
instant case was still pending.
8395 U.S. 337 at 343.
9 Larson v. Fetherston, I1 Av. Cas. 17,336 (Wis. S. Ct. 1969).
0 Because the judgments were reversed on the issue of procedural due process, the court did not
consider the issue of whether the funds deposited in the garnishees' bank constituted trust funds
not subject to garnishment.
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his 1959 Cessna aircraft. The application stated that no coverage was
required beyond 100 miles of the boundaries of Continental United States,
excluding Alaska. On 4 March 1963, plaintiff wrote the defendant that
he had purchased a different plane; that he would fly this aircraft to
Alaska in June 1963; and that he would like a bid from the defendant
on coverage. Thereafter, plaintiff telephoned defendant and was assured
that he was insured for flying to Alaska. The defendant personally pro-
cured the information from the plaintiff by telephone, but mistakenly
wrote in the application "No", to the question of whether coverage was
requested for Alaska. Subsequently, he signed plaintiff's name to the appli-
cation and procured a policy from Eagle Star. Upon the crash of the air-
plane in Alaska on 1 July 1963, plaintiff notified defendant promptly and
was assured of coverage for the loss. Upon Eagle Star's denial of any lia-
bility on the policy, plaintiff, alleging false and negligent representation
and interpretation of the Eagle Star policy, brought an action against the
defendant. Upon a judgment for the plaintiff, defendant appealed. Held,
affirmed: An agent who undertakes to procure insurance for another and
negligently fails to do so will be liable in tort or contract for damages
suffered by his client. Moreover, previous dealings with an agent gives
an aircraft owner the right to rely upon the agent's skill. Hall v. Charlton,
11 Av. Cas. 17, 111 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969).
In defendant's appeal, he contended that the court erred in not: (1)
Finding as a matter of fact that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent
in failing to read his policy; and (2) ruling as a matter of law that plain-
tiff was contributorily negligent and thereby estopped to recover. Counter-
ing this argument, the plaintiff explained: (1) That he had no training
interpreting the language of insurance policies; (2) that he had no legal
training; (3) that he could read, but that he could not interpret and
understand such language; and (4) that he habitually sought the services
of a qualified insurance agent, explained what coverage he wanted, and
relied on the agent's skill to procure it for him.
The court held that plaintiff had every right to rely on the defendant
because of his previous experience with him, and because of the defendant's
assurance that Alaska was included in coverage and the risk bound. In
arriving at this conclusion, the court referred to Kap-Pel Fabrics, Inc. v.
R. B. Jones and Sons' and the decision of Harris v. A. P. Nichols Insur-
ance Company" where the law, pertaining to a broker's liability to his
principal for negligent failure to perform, was thoroughly discussed. Re-
lying on these decisions, the instant court held:
Such action was not between an insured against insurer, but between a client
and his broker; that athe principal was entitled to rely upon and believe that,
pursuant to the duties assumed by the agent, and under his instructions to
proceed on the theory and belief that his agent procured such policy.3
In the defendant's claim of estoppel, the court, relying on the principal
'402 S.W.2d 49, 53 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966).
225 S.W.2d 484 (Mo. Ct. App. 1930).
3 Id., at 488.
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of law set forth in Land Clearance for Re-development Authority v. Dunn
which barred his defense, held:
No man can set up another's act or conduct as ground for estoppel unless he
has himself been misled or deceived by such act or conduct; nor can he set
it up where he knew or had the same means of knowledge as to the truth as
did the other party.'
J.E.N.
Preemption - Noise Abatement - Police Power
A complaint was filed against Stagg by the City of Santa Monica charg-
ing him with violation of a municipal ordinance which prohibits the take-
off of pure jet aircrafts between the hours of 11:00 p.m. of one day and
7:00 a.m. the next day.' The purpose of the ordinance is to alleviate noise
problems resulting from the takeoff of these aircraft. Stagg entered a
plea of not guilty and then filed a petition for a writ of prohibition seek-
ing to restrain the municipal court from proceeding with the trial. The
superior court granted the preemptory writ on the ground that the ordi-
nance was invalid because its subject matter was preempted by state law
From this judgment the City of Santa Monica appealed. Held: A munici-
pal ordinance that prohibits jet aircraft takeoffs at the municipal airport
during nighttime hours is a valid exercise of the municipality's police
power, so long as the regulation does not conflict with any state or
federal authority. Stagg v. Municipal Court of Santa Monica, 11 Avi. Gas.
17,404 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
It was argued by respondent that airport operations are a matter of state-
wide concern which require uniformity, and are, therefore, not a proper
subject of municipal regulations.' Although the court implied that some
types of airport operations might be preempted from municipal regula-
tion by state interests, it rejected any contention that the hours during
which municipal airport facilities are to be made available for jet plane
service are of statewide concern. In support of its opinion the court cited
that Government Code, section 50474 (f), which expressly authorizes a
municipality to "regulate the use of the airport and facilities and other
property or means of transportation within or over the airport." Therefore,
4416 S.W.2d 948 (Mo. 1967).
sid. at 951.
'Takeoffs are approved during the prohibited hours for reasons of emergency.
a Stagg had also urged that the ordinance was an unconstitutional attempt to regulate a field
preempted by federal law, but the court found it unnecessary to rule on the federal issue, The
California Appellate court nevertheless did, in dictum, conclude that federal preemption was not
applicable to municipal noise abatement regulations proyided the ordinance is not inconsistent with
federal safety standards. See generally, Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc. 61 Cal.
2d 582, 394 P.2d 548 (1964).
'Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco 228 F.2d 473 (1955).
'Cal. Government Code § 50474 (West 1966).
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in the absence of any finding of conflict with existing state or federal
legislation in the general field of aviation, the court concluded that the
ordinance was a valid exercise of the municipality's police power.
R.D.B.
Air Carrier's Liability - Limitation - All Services Tour
Plaintiffs instituted a negligence action against defendants, Swiss Air
Transportation Co. Ltd. (Swiss Air) and Flying Mercury, Inc. (Mercury).
Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that while they were in the course
of an "all services" tour of Spain, sold to them by defendants, they were
invited by defendants to use certain rest room facilities. The complaint
further alleged that one of the plaintiffs was injured as a result of the
dangerous and defective condition of the rest room facilities. Swiss Air
alleged as an affirmative defense .... "that the contract between plaintiffs
and the tour operator (Mercury) contained a provision exempting 'The
Airlines Concerned' of all responsibility for any act, omission, or event
which did not take place while the passengers were on board the airline's
planes or conveyances." It was undisputed that the accident in question
did not take place on the defendant's planes or conveyances. Plaintiffs
moved to dismiss this affirmative defense for insufficiency and appealed
from an order denying this motion. Held, order reversed: A clause in a
contract between passengers on an all services tour and the tour operator
that purports to limit the liability of the air carrier solely to those occasions
when the passengers are physically on board the aircraft is exculpatory in
that it attempts to reduce the air carrier's duty of safe carriage, and is in-
valid absent an allegation that the passengers were afforded a choice of
rates. Gold v. Swiss Air Transportation Co., Ltd., 11 Av. Cas. 17,355
(N.Y. 1969).
The paramount question before the New York Supreme Court, Appel-
late Division, was whether an air carrier's liability can be expressly limited
by contract to occasions when the passengers are physically on board the
plane when the carrier does not offer the passengers a choice of rates. The
court relied on Seccardi v. Yonkers R. R. Co.,1 which stated that the legal
relationship between the carrier and passenger, giving rise to a duty of
care, continues beyond the mere physical presence of the passenger on board
the conveyance. In discussing the extent of a carrier's liability beyond
the passenger's presence on board the conveyance, the court cited a North
Carolina case' which held that the carrier's duty of care continues when
the passenger alights at an intermediate stop, at the expressed or implied
invitation of the carrier, to employ rest room facilities. However, the court
a Art.. XI, section 11 of the California Constitution empowers cities and counties to make and
enforce "such local, police, sanitary, and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws."
190 N.Y. 389, 83 N.E. 31 (N.Y. 1907).
2 Goodman v. Queen City Lines, 208 N.C. 323, 180 S.W. 661 (N.C. 193),
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declined to decide whether the duty of safe carriage extended to the rest
room facilities in the instant case, preferring to decide only the most perti-
nent question regarding the validity of the contract clause. The court indi-
cated that the contract clause limiting the carrier's liability could not
conform with the public policy of the state unless the passengers were
offered "a choice of rates"3 so that full protection would be open to the
passengers upon their payment of a higher rate. In the instant case defend-
ant's failure to allege a choice of rates in his supporting affadavits was
fatal.
G.W.A.
Railway Labor Act - Maintenance of Status Quo -
Limit of Self-Help
On 17 January, 1969, three employees of National Airlines (National)
were fired by their employer for their refusal to taxi an aircraft; the men
apparently believed a recent National order to reduce the number of men
used in taxiing from three to two produced an unsafe working condition.
National's action precipitated a sitdown strike by other members of the
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM)
at National's New York and Miami airport facilities. Prior to the sit-down,
National and IAM had voluntarily invoked the operation of statutory
mediation procedures available under the Railway Labor Act (RLA)1 to
resolve a dispute arising out of desired changes in their collective bargain-
ing agreement. National immediately petitioned the U.S. District Court
in Miami for injunctive relief against the strikers, alleging that the pro-
ceedings in process under the RLA imposed a requirement that both IAM
and National maintain the status quo,' a condition violated through wild-
cat work stoppage by the union members. A preliminary injunction was
issued, ordering the workers to end their strike, and to restore the status
quo. National was ordered to reinstate the discharged workers. On 20
January, the strike was still in effect because of IAM's inability to persuade
its members to honor the court order. A second hearing before the district
court resulted in an order that "defendant advise their membership . . .
that all men return to work by their next shift . . . [or] be subject to
penalties which could include dismissal by National Airlines."3 After
further notice was given to the employees by National and IAM, and it
became apparent that the workers would continue to disregard the court
order, National discharged approximately 940 of the striking IAM union
members. The union immediately requested an injunction ordering rein-
'Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial Airways, 266 N.Y. 244, 194 N.E. 692 (N.Y. 1935).
'Railway Labor Act 5 2 Second, Seventh, 5 First (6), (10), 6, 44 Stat. 577, 580 582, as
amended, 64 Stat. 1238, 63 Stat. 107, 48 Stat. 1197, 45 U.S.C. 55 151a, 152, 155, 156 (1964).
'Railway Labor Act 55 2 Seventh, 5 First (6) (10), 44 Stat. 577, 580, as amended, 64 Stat.
1238, 63 Stat. 107, 45 U.S.C. 5 5 lla, 152, 155 (1964).
'416 F.2d at 1001.
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statement of the discharged employees. The District Court denied the
union's application, and IAM appealed. Held, reversed and remanded:
While the airlines under these circumstances might justify reasonable
efforts to continue operations during a wild-cat strike, the wholesale dis-
charge of the striking workers was not necessary to restore flight opera-
tion, and in so doing National violated its duty to maintain the status quo
until the dispute was settled. National Airlines, Inc. v. IAM, 416 F.2d 998
(5th Cir. 1969). On remand, the court issued a preliminary injunction
to enjoin National from using less than three men until either the Na-
tional Mediation Board completed its services relative to the bargaining or
the taxi crew issue was resolved by the System Board of Adjustment.
National Airlines, Inc. v. IAM, 11 Av. Cas. 17, 347 (S.D. Fla. 1969).
The fifth circuit speaking through Judge Thornberry resolved all
questions of the applicability of the RLA status quo provisions against
National. Pointing to the voluntary imposition of the RLA remedies by
the parties through the exchange of notices, the court indicated that the
underlying dispute was clearly within the contemplation of § 6 of the
RLA,4 with the result that it was the duty of the disputants to refrain
from further action until the procedures set in motion had run their course.
The maintenance of status quo is an essential ingredient of the RLA,
reasoned the court, for, unlike the NLRA, the primary interest reflected
in the federal regulation of common carriers is continuance of the em-
ployer's operations and the employer-employee relationship.' Furthermore,
National's duty to maintain the status quo remained even though the
strike by union members was illegal and the union itself had failed to
meet its obligation under the act.
The court does, however, indicate that some form of self-help was avail-
able to National in the circumstances of this case. Quoting from a recent
Supreme Court decision, the court noted that a "justification for permit-
ting the carrier to depart from the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement lies in its duty to continue to serve the public."' This self-help
is limited to the extent necessary to restore service, which could have been
achieved by simply hiring replacements for the striking workers. The
striking workers would not be permitted to compel National to discharge
the replacements or employ them at their old jobs upon settlement, since
the illegality of the strike forfeits their rights to reinstatement if their
jobs have been filled. It was, therefore, unnecessary for the court to imply
that discharge was a proper course of action for National to take in at-
tempting to continue airline operations. Hence, National's action under
the second injunction was improper.7
K.M.P.
"Railway Labor Act S 6, 44 Stat. 582, as amended, 48 Stat. 1197, 45 U.S.C. S 156 (1964).
5 416 F.2d at 1004; United Indust. Wkrs. of the Seafarer's Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Bd. of
Trustees of Galveston Wharves, 400 F.2d 320, 29, 30 (5th Cir. 1968).
6 Bhd. of Ry & S.S. Clerks, Freight Handlers, Exp. & Station Emp., AFL-CIO v. Florida E.
Coast Ry., 384 U.S. 238 (1966).
'The court further noted that National acted too quickly in discharging the workers in eight
of the permissive language in the injunction. The primary responsibility rested in the district court.
National should have returned to the court for further advise before resorting to self-help.
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Federal Aviation Act -Common Law Rights -
Contract Recission
Philco Corporation contracted with Flying Tiger Lines, Inc. to transport
expensive and extremely delicate electronic equipment. Flying Tiger agreed
to employ only certain types of carriage facilities in order to assure that the
cargo would be kept in an upright position at all times. Both parties were
aware that storage in a horizontal position would result in extensive damage
to the equipment. Both air bills of laden provided that the shipments were
subject to the governing classifications and tariffs, and that, unless other-
wise stated, the declared value of the equipment was set by the tariff on
file with the Civil Aeronautics Board at fifty cents per pound. Philco made
no higher declaration of value prior to shipment.
The first shipment arrived at its destination on 7 September 1963 in
damaged condition as a result of being transported horizontally instead
of in the agreed upright position. Philco immediately notified Flying Tiger
of the damage and was assured that the following shipment would be
properly processed. On 28 March 1964, the second shipment arrived in
severely damaged condition. Again the damage was a result of horizontal
transportation. As a result of the improper carriage, the equipment was
damaged in excess of $49,000.00.
Philco instituted an action for recission of the air freight bills and an
award of restitution. In the alternative, it sought relief for gross negligence
in the methods employed to transport the equipment. In granting Flying
Tiger's motion for summary judgment, the trial court held that the com-
mon law forms of relief sought by Philco were pre-empted by the tariff
rate provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (hereinafter Act).'
Philco would be entitled to damages computed at the rate set by the tariff
-fifty cents per pound or $1,001.50. From this adverse judgment, Philco
appealed. Held: Section 1506 of the Acte preserved the common law reme-
dies of shippers, provided that they are consistent with the statutory
scheme of regulation. Philco Corporation, et al. v. Flying Tiger Lines, Inc.
11 Av. Cas. 17,278 (Mich. Ct. App., 1969).
The purpose of the tariff rate provision is to assure uniformity of rates
and services to all shippers. The Act, however, did not intend to limit the
liability of a carrier who materially altered or violated his contract of
carriage. A contract can be rescinded if it is found that there is a material
breach of such a nature as to completely change the terms or risks in-
volved. It is up to the trial court to determine if a material breach has
occurred. No fact finding was made in Philco, thus the case had to be
remanded.
As to the issue of gross negligence, the court held that the remedy had
been pre-empted by the Act since previous cases had denied such relief to
shippe-. 2 The trial court decision on this point was affirmed. R. L. M.
' Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1373 (1964).
2 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1506 (1964).
a Mitchell v. Union 'Pacific R.R. Co., 188 F. Supp. 869 (S.D. Cal., 1960); Tishmen & Lipp, Inc.
v. Delta Airlines, 275 F. Supp. 471 (S.D. N.Y., 1967).
[Vol. 3 6
CURRENT LEGISLATION AND DECISIONS
Aircraft Ownership - Co-Owners - Liability
Appellee and the father of a deceased minor were co-owners of an air-
plane. The father and his minor child were killed while the former was
piloting the plane. The cause of the crash was the negligent flying of the
pilot-father. As a result, the child's administrix sued the surviving co-
owner on the theory that an airplane is a dangerous instrumentality and
that a co-owner is vicariously liable.! From the trial court's adverse hold-
ing, the administrix appeals. Held, affirmed: While an aircraft may be
classified as a dangerous instrumentality, one co-owner of an aircraft, who
is not actively negligent, is not liable for the negligent operation of the
aircraft by the second co-owner that results in the death of the latter's
child while that child is in his custody. Margaret Orefice v. Albert, 11 Av.
Cas. 17,248 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
The Florida Supreme Court has classified automobiles as dangerous in-
strumentalities.' Embracing the reasoning of that doctrine, the appellate
court expressly extended this classification to include airplanes as well,
while the trial court had refused to do so.
The remainder of the administrix's theory asserted that, if the airplane
were a dangerous instrumentality, then, there was a vicarious liability. The
trial court, basing its decision on other jurisdictions' holdings,' rejected
this argument. The appellate court also rejected the theory but on the
grounds of local Florida case law.4
The appellate ruling, however, did not foreclose the possibility of re-
covery for third parties killed in similar circumstances who are not minor
children. In essence, the holding is fairly narrow: "[O]ne co-owner of an
airplane who is not actually negligent is not liable for harm caused by the
negligent operation of the airplane by a second co-owner when the action
is for damages resulting from the death of the second co-owner's minor
child while the child is in the custody of the second co-owner [Emphasis
added.] '"'
Therefore, it may well be that a co-owner is only insulated from liability
in these particular circumstances. If the occupant were not a child of the
negligent pilot, or if he were illegally within the parent's custody, a differ-
ent result might follow.
R.H.G.
The deceased child's mother filed an action for damages which was joined with this suit. The
court, in affirming the trial court's grant of a motion for summary in the defendant's favor, held
that the mother could not recover since the child was in the father's custody and control with
her knowledge and consent.
' Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920); Anderson v. South-
ern Cotton Oil Co., 73 Fla. 432, 74 So. 975 (1917); Crenshaw Bros. Produce Co. v. Harper, 142
Fla. 27, 194 So. 353 (1940); Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956); Shattuck
v. Mullen, 115 So. 2d 597 (Fla. Ct. App. 1959).
3 According to the trial court, New York, California, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Oklahoma,
Arkansas, and North Carolina allow no recovery from an aircraft owner simply by reason of his
ownership. Maryland, Rhode Island, Nevada, Mississippi (federal case applying state law), Iowa,
and New Hampshire are to the contrary.
'Klepper v. Breslin, 83 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1955); Martinez v. Rodriguez, 215 So. 2d 305
(Fla. 1968).
'Orefice v. Albert, 11 Civ. Av. 17248, 17249.
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Criminal Law - Concealed Weapon - Attempt
To Board Aircraft
Defendant was checked in at San Antonio International Airport by an
agent of Braniff International and admitted to the departure lounge where
all passengers waited until flight time. An unknown person informed the
agent that he saw defendant drop an object which appeared to be a weapon.
An airport guard arrested and searched defendant finding a small caliber
pistol carried in violation of federal law.1 Defendant contended that he
could not be charged with the crime of "attempting to board an aircraft
while carrying a dangerous weapon" since he had never attempted to ac-
tually step on the plane. Held: The surrendering of the ticket at the
agent's desk and entering the departure lounge constituted an attempt by
the defendant to board the aircraft in violation of federal law. United
States v. Brown, 11 Av. Cas. 17,427 (W.D.Tex. 1969).
The primary issue before the court was whether the act of entering the
departure lounge after having been ticketed was sufficient to constitute an
attempt. The court delineated the standard for determining attempt as
"whether or not an effort or endeavor to accomplish the crime, amounting
to more than mere preparation or planning for it, which if not prevented
would have resulted in the full consummation of the act attempted."2 The
court reasoned that defendant's act amounted to more than preparation or
planning and was an attempt to board an aircraft while carrying a dan-
gerous weapon.
The defendant raised two other issues at trial; first, that his oral state-
ments were inadmissible since he had not been given the proper Miranda'
warnings before being questioned, and second, that the fruits of the search
were inadmissible since the guard4 had not obtained a search warrant. The
court found that the Miranda warnings had not been given and all state-
ments made by the defendant were improperly admitted into evidence.
However, the court held that the search of the defendant was proper
without a search warrant. The guard had probable cause to arrest the
defendant and the search was incident to the lawful arrest.' The court
found that even though the oral statements of the defendant could not
be considered, there was sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of guilty
made at the trial.
W.F.C.
'49 U.S.C. § 1472(1), 76 Stat. 921 (1963).
211 Av. Cas. 17427, 17429.
'Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
'The guard was an employee of the City of San Antonio and was exercising police powers
in that capacity. Vernon's Ann. Tex. Stat. Art. 46d-7 (1969).
' Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1941).
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Inverse Condemnation - Air Navigation Easement -Date Of Taking
In March of 1963, the plaintiffs filed an inverse condemnation suit
against the Jackson Municipal Airport Authority. The complaint alleged
that the defendant-airport had appropriated to public use an air navigation
easement "superadjacent" to the plaintiffs' lands, without the formality of
eminent domain proceedings, and demanded compensation as provided by
the Mississippi Constitution.' Due to unavoidable delays, the trial was not
held until August, 1966, and a final decree was not rendered until 30
January, 1969. The lower court held that an air navigation easement was
taken and that the enjoyment and use of plaintiffs' property had been sub-
stantially impaired. The plaintiffs were awarded compensation in the
amount of $25,602.00, which the chancellor concluded to be just on the
basis of values and conditions existing at the time of the trial. The defen-
dant appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court. Held, affirmed in part,
reversed and remanded in part: The determination of the amount of com-
pensation in an inverse condemnation proceeding is to be based upon the
values and conditions which existed as of the date the suit was filed, not the
date of the trial.' Jackson Municipal Airport Authority v. Wright, 11 Av.
Cas. 17,422 (Miss. 1970).
Decisions rendered in conventional condemnation suits have held the
general rule to be that compensation is calculated as of the date of taking,
that is, the date the application or petition is filed by the condemnor.' It
was further emphasized that the institution of an eminent domain suit
gives binding notice to the landowner and the condemnor.4 The Mississippi
Supreme Court held that this rule should not be applied in inverse condem-
nation proceedings which are initiated by the owner-condemnee.
The court reasoned that to hold the trial date as the date of taking would
be to ignore the fact that the actual taking must have occurred prior to
the filing of the suit in 1963, since the cause of action does not accrue
until after the taking. Such a decision would also allow economic fluctua-
tions which have occurred in the interim, between the filing date and the
trial date, to "affect the amount justly due as compensation for the prop-
erty or property right taken."' Justice Smith speaking for the court in
Wright said:
As the owner's right to claim compensation is immediate, use of the date of
filing as the date of taking is more realistic and definitizes both as to the
1Miss. Const. art. 3, sec. 17 (1890).
a The decree as affirmed except as to the amount of the award, which was reversed and re-
manded for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of compensation in light of this opinion.
Moreover,( the court held that air navigation easements obtained in former eminent domain pro-
ceedings do not bar inverse condemnation proceedings by the property owners in the event of
further invasion of the air space over the remainder of the property.
'Pearl River Valley Water Supply District v. Wright, 186 So. 2d 205, 206 (Miss. 1966);
Pearl River Valley Water Supply District v. Brown, 182 So. 2d 384 (Miss. 1966); Mississippi
State Highway Commissioners v. Hemphill, 176 So. 2d 282 (Miss 1965).
"Pearl River Valley Water Supply District v. Wood, 252 Miss. 580, 595, 172 So. 2d 196, 202-
203 (1965).
5 Av. Cas. at 17, 425.
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nature and extent of the taking and as to the amount of the compensation
due.'
By adhering to this pragmatic and realistic approach to the problem,
the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that constitutional compensation
for inverse condemnation, as for conventional condemnation, should be
based on values and conditions which existed at the time the suit was filed.
P.J.P.
Warsaw Convention - Wrongful Death - Right of Action
On 4 March 1966 a Canadian Pacific aircraft crashed while attempting
to land at Tokyo Airport, killing all passengers. An action for wrongful
death was brought in a New York state court on 3 March 1967 by Perry
Zousmer on behalf of two New York passengers, Jesse and Ruth Zousmer.
The executors of three Canadian passengers joined in the action. The com-
plaint, charging negligence and breach of warranty, was brought against
three defendants: Canadian Pacific Air Lines, Ltd. (CPA), a Canadian
corporation; Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc. (Douglas), a Delaware corpora-
tion; and Kollsman Instrument Corp. (Kollsman), a New York corpora-
tion. Douglas and Kollsman answered the complaint, and CPA moved to
dismiss the action brought on behalf of the Canadian decedents on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction under Article 28 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion and forum non conveniens. After an amended complaint adding a
sixth cause of action on behalf of another Canadian decedent was served,
Douglas and Kollsman moved to dismiss the entire amended complaint
because of improper service. The motion was granted.1 The court also
granted CPA's motion and dismissed the Canadian decedents' action against
it on the merits.' At the same time the court ordered Zousmer to serve a
second amended complaint stating any claims to be asserted against CPA.
On 18 April 1969 Zousmer complied with the order and alleged claims
against CPA based entirely on the Warsaw Convention.! CPA filed a peti-
tion removing the action to the United States District Court, Southern
District of New York.4 Held, remanded: The Warsaw Convention does not
in and of itself create an independent cause of action to recover for
wrongful death, and a claim grounded on the Convention does not present
a d. at 17, 426.
' A New York statute provides: .... a subsequent pleading asserted new or additional claims
for relief shall be served upon a party who has not appeared in the manner provided for service of
a summons ..... N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law & Rules § 3012(a) (McKinney 1961). Since the plaintiffs
did not comply after adding the sixth cause of action, the entire amended complaint was dismissed.
' Douglas and Kollsman were still proper parties with respect to Zousmer's claim of negligence
and breach of warranty. See infra note 5.
' The plaintiff alleged that the airline tickets did not comply with the notice requirements of
the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, 29 Oct. 1934,
49 Star. 3000, E.T.S. No. 876, otherwise known as the Warsaw Convention.
428 U.S.C. § 1441 (a), 1446(b) (1948).
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a claim or right arising under a treaty of the United States or a separate
and independent claim that would be removable to the federal courts.5
Zousmer v. Canadian Pacific Air Lines, Ltd., 11 Av. Cas. 17381 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
Applying the test of Gully v. First Nat'l Bank,' the court stated that for
an action to be removable the treaty in question must clearly create an
actual right in the plaintiff, and the right must be an essential factor in his
case. The Warsaw Convention and the rules promulgated thereunder
create, at most, the standards and presumptions of liability and thus merely
outline the "operative limits" of the cause of action granted the plaintiff
by local law.' The court reasoned that essentials such as the description of
the person or persons who may bring the suit or the person or persons who
have a right or interest in the suit, traditionally considered vital to the
creation of a new right of action, were lacking. Even though the Con-
vention does include provisions with respect to venue, presumptions of
liability, limitations on liability, and contributory negligence, the court
concluded that it does not create a cause of action. The court submitted
that any federal court which presumed to grant removal jurisdiction to
Warsaw claims would find itself "hopelessly lost in a no man's land of
undeveloped law."
The court also rejected the defendant's argument that Zousmer's claim
constituted a separate and independent claim and was thus removable. In
holding that Zousmer had asserted a valid cause of action for the wrongful
death of the New York decedents against all three of the defendants,8 the
court found that the complaint against CPA was not separate and inde-
pendent from the claims against Douglas and Kollsman. Zousmer simply
asserted wrongful death claims against all three defendants to recover for
a single wrong to each of the decedents. When a pleading alleges but one
wrong, for which a single relief is sought, there cannot be a separate and
independent claim for removal purposes. Differing theories of negligence,
breach of warranty, and the Warsaw Convention does not lend "separate
and independent" status to any one of them. Nor was there a finding of
"separate and independent" simply because Zousmer's claim against CPA
was based on a treaty of the United States. As noted above, the court indi-
cated that the effect of the Warsaw Convention was only to create a pre-
sumption of liability, leaving it for New York to grant the right of action.
In remanding the action the court admitted the uncertain state of the
law regarding the Warsaw Convention and its relationship to removel
' CPA alleged as separate grounds for removal diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
1332 (1964) and 28 U.S.C. S 1441 (a) (1948), contending that the service of the last amended
complaint constituted the sole and determinative pleading and as such involved only a New York
plaintiff and a Canadian defendant. The court rejected the argument holding that since the in-
voluntary amendment of a complaint, to clarify the issues, did not supersede the original com-
plaint, all parties listed were still parties to the action. Kollsman was a New York corporation,
and since Zousmer was a New York citizen, the requisite diversity was lacking.
6229 U.S. 109 (1936).
" New York law creates an action for wrongful death. N.Y. Dec. Est. Law § 130 (McKinney
1949).
8 See supra note 5.
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jurisdiction. Even though it recognized the need for a uniform body of
federal law involving international aviation matters based on the Warsaw
Convention, the question remains whether the court will, without Con-
gressional action, hold that the violations of the Warsaw Convention in
and of themselves create a case arising under a treaty of the United States.
L.G.A.
